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April 1974] Notes 
United States v. Falk: Developments in the 
Defense of Discriminatory Prosecution 
1113 
In October 1970, Jeffrey Falk was charged with refusing ·to 
submit to induction into the U.S. Army, in violation of the Selec-
tive Service Act of 1967 .1 The indictment alleged three additional 
violations of that Act: failure to possess a registration card issued 
in 1967, and failures to possess classification cards issued in 1968 
148. See text accompanying note 74 supra. 
149. See sources cited in note 136 supra. 
150. See sources cited in note 137 supra. 
151. See text accompanying notes 140-41 supra, 
1. 50 U.S.C. App. § 462 (1970), 
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and 1969. Prior to trial, Falk filed a motion to dismiss the card-
carrying counts, claiming that the government brought these charges 
for the purpose of chilling his first amendment rights and punishing 
him for his draft-counseling activities. The motion was denied by 
the district judge without an evidentiary hearing. An offer of proof 
of his contention was also rejected at trial. After Falk was found 
guilty on all four counts by a jury verdict, the district judge acquitted 
him on the induction-refusal count, ruling that Falk had been en-
titled to classification as a conscientious objector. Falk was then 
sentenced to three consecutive one-year prison terms for the card-
carrying convictions. 
A Seventh Circuit panel affirmed, Judge Sprecher dissenting.2 
On rehearing en bane, however, that court, four-three, reversed the 
panel and vacated Falk's conviction.8 Judge Sprecher,' writing for 
the majority, found that the evidence established a prima facie case 
of discriminatory enforcement of the draft card law. The case was 
remanded for a hearing, at which the burden of going forward with 
proof of nondiscrimination would rest on the government. Judge 
Cummings, in dissent, argued that the court should not inquire 
into the motivation of the prosecution;4 that Falk's unsupported 
allegations were insufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing;rs and 
that these allegations, even if true, would not establish that the 
prosecution was impermissibly brought.6 
It was not denied that Falk had committed a crime by violating 
the draft card law. Nor was it denied that a showing of discrimina-
tory prosecution of the law may, in some circumstances (for ex-
ample, where the discrimination is based on race), provide a com-
plete defense to a criminal charge. But the eight judges, including 
the district judge, that considered the question divided evenly on 
the applicability of this defense to Falk's prosecution. This Note 
will first review the origin and development of the defense of dis-
criminatory prosecution and will then analyze the situation in 
United States v. Falk. The Note concludes that Falk is significant in 
that it continues the device of shifting the burden to the prosecution 
once a prima facie case of discriminatory enforcement has been es-
tablished. More importantly, by implicitly eliminating the necessity 
of showing purposeful discrimination, Falk represents an important 
and praiseworthy development. 
The defense of discriminatory prosecution stems from the case 
2. United States v. Falk, 472 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1972), revd. en bane, 479 F.2d 616 
(7th Cir. 1973). 
ll. United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1978). 
4. 479 F.2d at 628-31. 
5. 479 F.2d at 631-33. 
6. 479 F.2d at 633-36. 
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of Yick Wo v. Hopkins.1 Yick Wo had been convicted of violating a 
San Francisco ordinance that banned the operation of laundries in 
buildings made of materials other than brick or stone unless consent 
was obtained from the local board of supervisors. The defendant 
had sought the required consent but had failed to obtain it, ·despite 
the safe condition of his laundry.8 It was admitted that the board 
had refused consent to all Chinese laundrymen, while consent had 
been given to all but one non-Chinese laundrymen.9 The Supreme 
Court found no fault in the statute; nevertheless, it granted a writ 
of habeas corpus, holding that the unequal application of the ordi-
nance was a denial of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed 
by the fourteenth amendment: "Though the law itself be fair on 
its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and admin-
istered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, 
so as practically to make unjust and illegal discrimination between 
persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial 
of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution."10 
Thus, Yick Wo established that the equal protection clause of the 
fourteenth amendment applies to executive, as well as legislative, 
action by the states.11 The practical necessity for this result is com-
pelling: A discriminatory classification that would be unconstitu-
tional if created by a state statute should not be permissible if it is 
created, instead, through selective enforcement by administrators 
and prosecutors. 
The discriminatory classification in Yick Wo was created by the 
licensing board, rather than by enforcement officials. Hence, many 
courts refused to consider similar claims where only prosecutorial 
selectivity was challenged.12 Other courts found this distinction arti-
ficial in light of the Court's broad rationale in Yick Wo and allowed 
discriminatory enforcement to be raised as a defense against discre-
tionary actions of law enforcement officials.13 The dispute may have 
7. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
8. 118 U.S. at 874. 
9. 118 U.S. at 859. 
IO. 118 U.S. at 873-74. 
11. Cf. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 399, 347 (1880): "The constitutional provision ••• 
must mean that no agency of the State, or of the officers or agents by whom its powers 
are exerted, shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws." See also Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal 
Laws, 61 C0Lu11r. L. REv. 1103, 1105 n.9 (1961). 
12. See, e.g., People v. Montgomery, 47 Cal. App. 2d 1, 117 P .2d 437 (1941); Society of 
Good Neighbors v. Mayor of Detroit, 324 Mich. 22, 36 N.W. 2d 308 (1949); Bailleaux v. 
Gladden, 230 Ore. 606, 370 P.2d 722, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 848 (1962). See also 
Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 
CoLU!lr. L. REv. 1103 (1961); Comment, Intentional Discriminatory Enforcement of 
Criminal Statute Held to Violate the Fifth Amendment, 55 MINN. L. R.Ev. 1234 (1971). 
13. See, e.g., People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., Inc., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d 
128 (1962); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 443 Pa. 305, 379 A.2d 26 (1971), cert. denied, 404 
U.S. 1008 (1971). 
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been resolved by the Supreme Court's statement in Two Guys From 
Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley,14 a case in which the owners 
of a department store sought an injunction against further enforce-
ment of a Pennsylvania Sunday-closing law, claiming that the law 
was being discriminatorily enforced. Denying the injunction, the 
Court noted: "[A]ppellant contends that there are still pending 
prosecutions against its employees initiated as the result of the al-
leged discriminatory action. Since appellant's employees may de/encl 
against any such proceeding that is actually prosecuted on the ground 
of unconstitutional discrimination, we do not believe the court be-
low was incorrect in refusing to exercise its injunctive powers at that 
time."15 The Court did not say that discriminatory prosecution would 
be a valid defense; it only noted that the possibility of establishing 
such a defense justified the denial of immediate injunctive relief. 
But, since this dictum, the defense has routinely been recognized, 
even where the crime charged was not the result of a discriminatory 
administrative decision16 and the defendant had admittedly com-
mitted a crime.11 
14. 366 U.S. 582 (1961). 
15. 366 U.S. at 58&-89 (emphasis added). See also Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 857, 
359 (1953). 
16. See, e.g., United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. 
Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972); People v. Gray, 254 Cal. App. 2d 256, 263, 63 
Cal. Rptr. 211, 215 (1967); People v. Walker, 14 N.Y.2d 901, 200 N.E.2d 779, 252 
N.Y.S.2d 96 (1964). See also United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1973); 
Givelber, Selective Enforcement of the Criminal Law, 1973 U. !LL. L.F. 88, 93 n.19 
("It is clearly the case that courts which have recently considered the problem regularly 
accept the principle that discriminatory prosecution violates the equal protection 
clause."). 
17. It may seem illogical to exonerate a guilty defendant simply because the 
prosecutor erred. Cf., e.g., People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587-88 (1926) 
("because the constable has blundered"). However, as with the e.xclusionary rule for 
illegally obtained evidence, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), there does not seem 
to be any other way to force the prosecution to respect the dictates of the Constitution. 
But see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Petitions for writs of mandamus to compel 
prosecution of known offenders have been filed, but they have uniformly been denied 
on the ground of the separation-of-powers doctrine. See Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 
F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Moses v. Kennedy, 219 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1963), a/fd, sub 
nom. Moses v. Katzenbach, 342 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Even were mandamus avail• 
able, it might not be practical or desirable to require prosecution of all known offenders 
of, for example, gambling laws or the draft card law. See Breitel, Controls in Criminal 
Law Enforcement, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 427 (1960); Goldstein, Police Discretion Not To 
Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 
69 VALE L.J. 543, 586-88 (1960). See also Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 481-82 
(D.C. Cir. 1967). Injunctions ordering equal treatment of all future offenders have also 
been sought, but generally without success. O'Shea v. Littleton, 42 U.S.L.W. 4139 (U.S., 
Jan. 15, 1974); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, reh. denied, 391 U.S. 971 (1968). But 
see Wade v. City of San Francisco, 82 Cal. App. 2d 337, 186 P.2d 181 (1947); Covington 
v. Gausepohl, 250 Ky. 323, 62 S.W .2d 1040 (1933). 
It should also be noted that a finding of discriminatory enforcement need only result 
in a dismissal of the charge, not in an acquittal (see, e.g., United States v. Berrigan, 482 
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Of course, the failure to prosecute some offenders because of the 
prosecution's lack of knowledge of the crime or because of the 
insufficiency of the evidence does not deny equal protection to those 
who are prosecuted.18 At the least, the defendant must show that the 
law is not being enforced against offenders who are known to the 
prosecution and who are "in similar circumstances [to the defendant], 
material to their rights."19 The nature of the rights that cannot be 
infringed by prosecutorial classifications was partially clarified by 
the Supreme Court in Oyler v. Boles.20 Oyler was sentenced under 
West Virginia's habitual criminal statute, which provided a man-
datory life sentence upon a third conviction of certain serious crimes. 
He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was dis-
criminated against in that 904 other three-time offenders had not 
been given mandatory life sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed 
a denial of habeas corpus. The Court noted the absence of any alle-
gation that the prosecution knew of the prior convictions of the 
904 others and then added: "Moreover, the conscious exercise of 
some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitu-
tional violation. Even though the statistics in this case might imply 
a policy of selective enforcement, it was not stated that the selection 
was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, 
religfon, or other arbitrary classification."21 
The terms "unjustifiable standard" and "arbitrary classification;' 
suggest that the Court is referring to the now-familiar equal pro-
tection rubric of "rational relation," "suspect classifications," and 
"compelling state interests"22 and will utilize these tests in cases of 
discriminatory prosecution, as well as in cases where the law itself 
is challenged as unconstitutional._ It seems reasonable to subject 
both legislative and prosecutorial classifications to basically the same 
test under the equal protection clause.23 Indeed, this would seem 
to be the essence of Yick Wo.24 
F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973); People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., Inc., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 225 
N.Y.S.2d 128 (1962)); thus, it would seem that the defendant could still be convicted if 
the government brings a new indictment that is not based on a discriminatory policy. 
But see Comment, supra note 11, at 1112. 
18. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); Washington v. United States, 401 F.2d 915, 
925 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
19. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). 
20. 368 U.S. 448 (1962). 
21. 368 U.S. at 456 (emphasis added). 
22. See text accompanying notes 55-60 infra. For a thorough discussion of these tests, 
see Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969). See also 
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Ev_olving Doctrine 
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L REv. I (1972). 
23. See Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Initiation of Criminal Complaints, 
42 S. CAL. L. REv. 519, 541 (1969); note 11 supra. 
24. See 118 U.S. at 372-74. 
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It has been suggested25 that it is not the proper function of 
enforcement officials to make broad policy decisions that create 
classifications, even if such classifications would be legitimate if 
passed by a legislature. This would indicate that a reviewing court 
owes more deference to the judgment of a legislature than to that 
of an administrator. In any case, the classification will have the 
same effect on constitutional rights regardless of whether it was 
made by a legislature or an administrator. Therefore, it should at 
least be submitted to the same judicial tests under the equal pro-
tection clause, although the courts may appropriately indulge in a 
stronger presumption of legitimacy where the classification is devised 
by a legislature.26 However, in ruling on equal protection challenges 
in discriminatory prosecution cases, courts customarily refer only 
to the Oyler Court's phrase, "race, religion, or other arbitrary clas• 
sification,"27 and do not advert to the minimum rationality or strict 
scrutiny tests.28 
In contrast to their approach in evaluating the constitutionality 
of legislative classifications, courts have generally required a showing 
of purposeful discrimination in selective enforcement cases.20 Oyler 
stated that a policy of selective enforcement would be upheld unless 
it were "deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard."80 The 
implication of "deliberately" is not at all clear. It may mean only 
that there must be awareness of other offenders, that is, that the 
prosecution must be conscious that it is selectively enforcing the law. 
But the .Oyler Court, in support of its statement, cited Snowden v. 
Hughes,81 a case that used the words "intentional'' and "purposeful" 
in a way that implied bad faith, or awareness of the unjustifiability 
of the standard of selection. Snowden was one of several candidates 
running for state representative in an Illinois Republican primary 
election. Under a proportional representation scheme authorized 
25. Comment, supra note 11, at 1117-18; Developments in the Law-Equal Pro• 
tection, supra note 22, at 1077-87. 
26. But see Givelber, supra note 16, at 119 n.124: "The question is whether a given 
instance of selective enforcement is rationally related to legitimate administrative 
purposes, not whether the legislature could have written a law incorporating the 
policies that the administrator employs." 
27. 368 U.S. at 456. See, e.g., Washington v. United States, 401 F.2d 915, 924 (D.C. 
Cir. 1968) (dictum); People v. Sawicki, 4 Mich. App. 467, 476-77, 145 N.W.2d 286, 240 
(1966); Dimaggio v. Brown, 19 N.Y.2d 283, 290, 225 N.E.2d 871, 875, 279 N.Y.S.2d 161, 
166 (1967). 
28. See text accompanying notes 55-60 infra. This may be due to the fact that courts 
still require a showing of bad faith in discriminatory prosecution cases. See cases cited 
in note 37 infra. A finding of bad faith means that the state interest advanced is itself 
unconstitutional, so the prosecutorial policy fails the minimum rationality test, and 
there is no need for further inquiry as to the "fundamental" interests affected. 
~9. See cases cited in note 27 supra. 
30. 368 U.S. at 456. 
31. 368 U.S. at 456, citing 321 U.S. I (1944). 
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by statute, two candidates were to be nominated on the Republican 
ticket, but the State Primary Canvassing Board designated only one 
nominee and excluded Snowden, who had received the second 
highest vote total. No reason for the Board's action was alleged in 
the complaint. Snowden's civil suit to recover damages for infringe-
ment of his civil rights was dismissed, and the Supreme Court 
affirmed: 
[W]here the official action purports to be in conformity to the statu-
tory classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of the 
statutory duty, although a violation of the statute, is not without 
more a denial of the equal protection of the laws. 
The unlawful administration by state officers of a state statute 
fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who 
are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection 
unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional 
or purposeful discrimination.32 
Snowden appears to require a showing of actual malice. But this 
requirement should be applied only in cases of alleged discrimina-
tion against a lone complainant or defendant. Where there is no 
allegation of selectivity against an identifiable class, the existence of 
an unjustifiable standard can only be demonstrated by showing the 
subjective motivation of the administrator or prosecutor. Where the 
existence of an impermissible standard can be shown by objective 
criteria, there should be no need to prove that the standard was 
applied with malice.33 The Supreme Court apparently recognized 
this distinction in a later case, Edelman v. California,34 where it 
referred to "the necessity of showing systematic or intentional dis.: 
crimination."35 Moreover, Snowden was a civil action against the 
administrator for damages. It may be legitimate to require a showing 
of bad faith in such an action, in order to prevent the administrator 
from being held liable for a good faith mistake,36 but this rationale 
would not apply to a case of alleged discriminatory prosecution, 
where the relief sought is merely dismissal of charges. There is, 
therefore, no need to interpret Snowden and Oyler as requiring a 
showing of malice in all cases in which the party seeks to establish 
discriminatory prosecution. 
Nevertheless, many lower courts have cited Snowden in inap-
posite situations and may, therefore, be utilizing a bad faith test.37 
82. 321 U.S. at 8. 
llll. See Givelber, supra note 16, at 113-14 n.110. 
34. 344 U.S. 857 (1958). 
35. 344 U.S. at 359 (dictum; emphasis added). 
36. See Horowitz, Unseparate but Equal-The Emerging Fourteenth Amendment 
Issues in Public Education, 13 UCLA L. R.Ev. 1147, 1152 (1966). 
87. See, e.g., Shock v. Tester, 405 F-2d 852, 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 894 U.S. 
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Since duly enacted statutes are routinely struck down under the equal 
protection clause without any inquiry into the bad faith of the 
legislature, it seems anomalous to require a showing of prosecutorial 
malice in discriminatory enforcement cases. Furthermore, since 
courts are historically loathe to inquire into the motivation of the 
executive branch,88 such a requirement puts a defendant in some-
thing of a dilemma: He is required to prove a fact that the court will 
not let him establish by direct questioning of the prosecution, a 
method of proof that may well be the only means available. 
In most cases where the defense of discriminatory enforcement 
has been raised, it is impossible to tell whether the court is utilizing 
a bad faith test, for the defendant must first establish what the 
standard of selectivity is before he can attack it as unjustifiable and 
the evidence that tends to show the standard used generally indicates 
prosecutorial malice as well.30 Hence, in those cases where the 
defense is allowed, it is impossible to say whether the court inferred 
malice or simply regarded malice as irrelevant to the question of 
whether the standard employed was constitutional. In at least one 
case,40 the prosecutor had apparently relied on citizen complaints to 
bring violations to his attention and had enforced the law uniformly 
against all reported violators. Although there is no clear prosecutorial 
bad faith in such a policy, it may still constitute discrimination of 
the first magnitude, due to the selectivity exercised by the complain-
ing citizenry.41 Here, too, if the court were to allow the defense of 
discriminatory prosecution, it would not be clear whether the bad 
faith of the complainants was being attributed to the prosecutor or 
prosecutorial connivance was being inferred or no finding of malice 
was being required at all. 
Even assuming that no showing of malice is required, the 
defendant usually faces grave difficulties merely in proving that an 
1020 (1969); United States v. Ahmad, 347 F. Supp. 912, 927 (M.D. Pa. 1972); United 
States v. Hercules, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 102, 104 (D. Kan. 1971); People v. Gray, 254 Cal. 
App. 2d 256, 268, 63 Cal. Rptr. 211, 219 (1967); People v. Gillespie, 41 Mich. App. 748, 
751, 201 N.W.2d 104, 105 (1972). Cf. Rhinehart v. Rhay, 440 F.2d 718, 727 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 825 (1971). 
38. E.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130-31 (1810) (dictum); Newman V. 
United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th 
Cir. 1965). But see Professor Davis' strong criticism of this attitude in K. DAVIS, Dis-
CRETIONARY JUSTICE! A PRELIMINARY INQUffiY 209-10 (1969). 
39. See, e.g., United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. 
Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972); People v. Gray, 254 Cal. App. 2d 256, 63 Cal. 
Rptr. 211 (1967); People v. Walker, 14 N.Y.2d 901, 200 N.E.2d 779, 252 N.Y.S.2d 96 
(1964). 
40. People v. Tornatore, 46 Misc. 2d 908, 261 N.Y.S.2d 474 (Poughkeepsie City Ct, 
1965). 
41. See People v. Tornatore, 46 Misc. 2d 908, 261 N.Y.S.2d 474 (Poughkeepsie City Ct. 
1965). 
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unjustifiable standard led to his prosecution.42 Discriminatory prose-
cution is an affirmative defense, so the burden of proof on this issue 
rests with the defendant.43 Evidence of the actual standard employed 
is, for the most part, solely ·within the prosecutor's control and un-
available to the defendant.44 The problem of proof may be reduced, 
however, if courts are willing to allow inferences from statistical 
data40 or strong circumstantial evidence to establish a prima facie 
case of discriminatory enforcement, thereby shifting to the govern-
ment the burden of going forward with the evidence.46 This was 
done in United States v. Crowthers,41 which involved a government 
regulation that required a permit for the holding of an assembly at 
the Pentagon. The fact that Pentagon officials had enforced this 
regulation against a prayer service for peace in Vietnam, but not 
against a demonstration welcoming then Vice-President Agnew, was 
sufficient for the Court to infer that the selective enforcement policy 
was based on speech content, rather than on some permissible 
grounds. Consequently, the Court imposed on the government the 
burden of proving nondiscrimination.48 
But the defendant can only benefit from burden shifting after he 
has succeeded in establishing a prima facie case. The defendant's 
. ' 
42. See generally Comment, The Viability of Discriminatory Prosecution as a De-
fense to a Criminal Charge, 19 LOYOLA L. REv. 318 (1973). 
43. United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. 
Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850, 860 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 970 (1973). Generally, the 
defense must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. See People v. Utica 
Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 18, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128, 134 (1962). See also People v. 
Gray, 254 Cal. App. 2d 256, 63 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1967). 
44. See United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 180-81 (3d Cir. 1973); United States 
v. Ahmad, 347 F. Supp. 912, 928 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Comment, supra note 42. 
45. Compare People v. Harris, 182 Cal. App. 2d 837, 5 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1960) with 
People v. Winters, 171 Cal. App. 2d 876, 342 P.2d 538 (1959). See also People v. Gray, 
254 Cal. App. 2d 256, 268-69, 63 Cal. Rptr. 211, 219-20 (1967). 
46. United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972); United Stat.es v. Crowthers, 
456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972). See also Givelber, supra note 16, at 1006-12. But cf. 
United States v. Ahmad, 347 F. Supp. 912, 928-29 (M.D. Pa. 1972). 
47. 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972). 
48. "It is neither novel nor unfair to require the party in possession of the facts to 
disclose them." 456 F.2d at 1078. See also United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th 
Cir. 1972). Professor Givelber gives cogent theoretical support for this device. Givelber, 
supra note 16, at 106-12. 
Steele and Crowthers both involved actions of the federal government, which, of 
course, is not subject to the strictures of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection 
clause. But the fifth amendment's due process clause has been held to include a 
guarantee of equal protection in some circumstances. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 
411 U.S. 677 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 64H2 (1969); Schneider v. 
Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-99 (1954); Wash-
ington v. United States, 401 F.2d 915, 922-23 (D.C. Cir. 1968), quoting Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886): "We think that it may safely be decided that in the 
sober relationship of the citizenry to the criminal laws, the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth contains the same 'pledge of the protection of equal laws' as is evident from the 
Fourteenth." 
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basic problem in shmving the standard of selection used is that this 
standard may exist only in the prosecutor's mind.49 Allowing the 
defendant to call the prosecutor as a witness would encourage dila-
tory tactics50 without really helping the defendant, who could only 
guess at the actual standard employed and thus would have no real 
basis on which to attack the credibility of the prosecutor's statements. 
Moreover, if the decision to prosecute is made by a hierarchy of 
several officials, as it apparently was in Falk,61 which official's motiva-
tion should be the deciding factor? A far more effective solution has 
been suggested by Professor Davis: "Prosecutors, in my opinion, 
should be required to make and to announce rules that will guide 
their choices, stating as far as practicable what will and what will 
not be prosecuted, and they should be required otherwise to structure 
their discretion."52 Such a requirement not only would make it 
easier for individual defendants to challenge the constitutionality of 
the standards employed but also would permit the wisdom of those 
standards to be subject to normal political processes. Very few prose-
cutors and administrative agencies have announced such rules.118 But 
if and when such rules are adopted, they ,vill generally give the 
defendant prima facie evidence of the selection standard leading to 
his prosecution. He may then concentrate his efforts on what should 
be the crux of the issue: whether that standard violates the constitu-
tional guarantee of equal protection. 
As noted above,1>4 the equal protection clause should impose the 
same requirements on a prosecutorial classification as it does on a 
legislative one. The basic requirement for the latter is that the 
classification bear a rational relationship to a permissible govern-
mental purpose. Until quite recently,55 few statutory classifications 
failed this test, 58 since legislative action carried such a strong pre-
sumption of constitutionality.57 However, where the classification 
created is historically suspect58 or affects a fundamental interest,n° 
it will be subjected to the far more rigorous "strict scrutiny" test: 
49. See K. DAVIS, supra note 38, at 224. 
50. See Falk, 479 F.2d at 631 n.8 (Cummings, J., dissenting). 
51. 479 F.2d at 622. 
52. K. DAVIS, supra note 38, at 225. 
53. Professor Davis notes one outstanding exception: the General Counsel of the 
National Labor Relations Board. Id. at 205-07. 
54. See text accompanying notes 22-26 supra. 
55. An excellent discussion of recent cases is found in Gunther, supra note 22. 
56. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), is a leading example of one that failed. 
57. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Goesaert v. Cleary, 
335 U.S. 464 (1948); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commrs., 330 U.S. 552 (1947). 
But see note 62 infra. 
58. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race). 
59. E.g., Hatper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting). 
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The classification will be declared to be a violation of equal protec-
tion unless it is necessary to further a compelling state interest. To 
date, no classification, legislative or administrative, has ever satisfied 
this test.60 
Although the courts have not used these tests in discriminatory 
prosecution cases, perhaps because Oyler and Yick Wo were decided 
before the two-tiered analysis was developed, it seems reasonable to 
utilize that approach.61 Most cases are readily explainable in terms 
of such an analysis. For example, in Crowthers, the Court inferred 
that individuals were prosecuted for violating the ordinance regulat-
ing demonstrations at the Pentagon only if their demonstrations 
were not favorably viewed by Pentagon officials. It could have been 
argued that this selection standard satisfied the minimum rationality 
test because, for example, antiwar demonstrations might have a more 
demoralizing effect on Pentagon employees than would other demon-
strations. But the right to hold peaceful assemblies-of whatever 
character-is an interest protected by the first amendment against 
congressional infringement. The interests protected by the first 
amendment are "fundamental,"62 although, where they are infringed 
by state action, courts may invoke the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment, rather than the equal protection clause, to invali-
date the action.63 Since a fundamental interest is involved, the selec-
tion standard used by the Pentagon officials must be subjected to the 
compelling state interest test-which it could not have survived. The 
Crowthers court did not speak expressly in these terms, but reached 
the same result: "For officials of the United States government to 
selectively and discriminatorily enforce [the regulation] so as to turn 
it into a scheme whereby activities protected by the First Amend-
60. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
But cf. Bums v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973). 
61. See Givelber, supra note 16, at 117 n.118. 
62. Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 
30-31 (1968). See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 16 n.39 
(1973); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 
268, 272 (1951). 
In recent yeats, some members of the Court have indicated a desire to move away 
from the two-tiered analysis of equal protection toward some sliding scale approach 
(see Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (White, J., concurring); San Antonio Inde-
pendent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)) or, more 
likely, toward a "heightened" requirement of rationality in cases on the lower tier 
(see Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 
438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)). See also Gunther, supra note 22. But, 
regardless of the specific analysis used, it seems safe to assert that the involvement of a 
first amendment interest in a challenged classification would be a very considerable 
weight in the decisional scales. 
63. See Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 
(1946); Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1962). Cf. Develop-
ments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 22, at 1128. But cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 
379 U.S. 536, 557-58 (1965). 
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ment are allowed or prohibited in the uncontrolled discretion of 
these officials violates the defendants' right to equal protection of the 
laws embraced within the due process of law clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. "64 
The situation in United States v. Steele65 was similar to that in 
Crowthers. Steele was one of four defendants in Hawaii charged with 
refusing to answer questions on the 1970 census form, in violation of 
a federal statute. He alleged discriminatory prosecution, pointing to 
the fact that the only offenders in the state that were prosecuted were 
those who had publicly participated in a census resistance movement, 
even though at least six other violators must have been known to the 
government. Since the alleged prosecutorial standard discriminated 
on the basis of speech content, the case could have been analyzed 
under the equal protection clause as suggested above in connection 
with Crowthers. But the Ninth Circuit, after citing Yick Wo and 
noting that the due process clause of the fifth amendment accords 
the same equal protection guarantee to a federal defenaant, 60 stated 
simply that "Steele is entitled to an acquittal if his evidence proved 
that the authorities purposefully discriminated against those who 
chose to exercise their First Amendment rights.''67 The evidence was 
found sufficient to prove that this was the standard employed, and 
Steele's conviction·was reversed. 
In Steele, the government denied that it had exercised any selec-
tivity at all, claiming unsuccessfully that it had prosecuted all similar 
_offenses that had been discovered. 68 The court might have reached a 
different decision if the government had instead admitted the exer-
cise of some selectivity and then attempted to show that the selection 
standard was constitutionally permissible. Few facts are given in the 
opinion, but it appears that the government could have argued that 
its selection standard was to prosecute only those offenses that were 
likely to have a strong deterrent effect on potential offenders-and 
that offenses by vocal census resistors would have a broader impact 
than would offenses by ordinary citizens. A somewhat similar 
standard was approved, in dictum, by the New York Appellate 
Division in People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co.: "Selective enforcement 
may also be justified when a striking example or a few examples are 
sought in order to deter other violators, as part of a bona fide 
rational pattern of general enforcement, in the expectation that gen-
eral compliance will follow and that further prosecutions will be 
64. 456 F.2d at 1080. 
65. 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972). 
66. See note 48 supra. 
67. 461 F.2d at 1151. 
68. 461 F.2d at 1152. 
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' 
unnecessary."69 Since a "striking example" policy of selective prosecu.: 
tion is not deliberately aimed at punishing the exercise of free speech, 
the Steele court might simply have upheld the conviction for failure 
to show prosecutorial malice or bad faith. But if the court were not 
to regard malice as a sine qua non,70 it would have to decide whether 
such a standard of selection was "unjustifiable" within the meaning 
of Oyler. The government's interest in enfqrcing its criminal law 
through a "striking example" policy is legitimate; there is little 
doubt that such a policy would survive the traditional minimum 
rationality test, but whether it would have survived a higher stan-
dard is unclear. 
The form of Steele's protest was not adequately described by the 
opinion. It could have constituted either regulable conduct71 • or 
protected free speech. If it were the latter, the policy would adversely 
affect the exercise of freedom of speech-an interest regarded as 
fundamenta172-and would have to undergo the stricter scrutiny of 
the compelling governmental interest test. Whether strict scrutiny 
should be applied would depend on the actual facts surrounding 
Steele's protest activities. Any adverse impact on first amendment 
rights would have to be weighed against the government's legitimate 
interest in the "striking example" policy, and less restrictive alterna-
tives would have to be considered. 
Applying equal protection analysis to Falk may clarify the court's 
opinion. The first step in that analysis is to determine the policy used 
by the prosecution. The majority in Falk held that the evidence at 
trial made out at least a prima facie case of improper discriminatory 
enforcement of the draft card law, in violation of the equal protec-
tion aspect of the fifth amendment's due process clause. However, 
the opinion did not clearly define the prosecutorial policy that the 
court found to be improper. This resulted in some confusion: The 
dissenting opinions attacked the adequacy of Falk's showing that the 
prosecution was deliberately brought to punish him for his draft 
counseling activity-an enforcement policy that might not have 
been the subject of the majority's holding. Indeed, the opinions 
allude to three possible prosecutorial policies. 
In his pretrial motion to dismiss the card-carrying counts of the 
69. 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 21, 225 N.Y.S.2d 126, lll6 (1962). See also Schwartz, Federal 
Criminal Jurisprudence and Prosecutor's Discretion, 13 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 64, 84 
(1948). 
70. See text accompanying notes 33-38 supra. 
71. Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968): "[W]hen 'speech' and 
'nonspeech' elements are co~bined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently impor-
tant governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental 
limitations on First Amendment freedoms." 
72. See note 62 supra. 
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indictment, Falk alleged that the government had deliberately 
selected for prosecution those offenders whose legal activities ( draft 
counseling and opposition to the Vietnam War) were disfavored and 
that such prosecution was purely for the purpose of punishing and 
stifling these protected first amendment activities. In support of his 
motion, Falk claimed that over 25,000 other registrants had violated 
the draft card law but had not been indicted.73 At trial, Falk's 
attorney offered to prove that the Assistant U.S. Attorney who was 
prosecuting the case had told him that few indictments were brought 
for nonpossession of draft cards, and that the government had 
brought the card-carrying charges against Falk in part because of his 
draft counseling activity. The holdings in Steele and Crowthers make 
it clear that such a policy, if proved, would be unconstitutional and 
would justify a dismissal of the indictment. It is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that Falk was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to estab-
lish that this was the reason for his indictment on the card-carrying 
counts.74 
But Falk had not yet demonstrated prima facie that intentional 
discrimination against the exercise of first amendment rights was the 
government's policy, so the burden of proving that fact should rest 
on him at the evidentiary hearing on remand. As the dissenting 
opinion of Judge Cummings pointed out at length, Falk had merely 
made unsupported allegations as to this policy.75 He attempted to 
corroborate his charge by citing a 1969 policy statement of the 
Director of the Selective Service System that indicated that registrants 
who turned in their draft cards would not be prosecuted; instead, 
their induction orders would be punitively accelerated. This state-
ment was offered to show that the government had violated its own 
policy in prosecuting Falk.76 However, that policy statement was 
78. Judge Cummings' dissent correctly observes that Falk failed to allege whether 
the government was aware of the 25,000 other alleged violations. 479 F.2d at 627 n.4. 
Of course, if the government were unaware of other violators, enforcement against Falk 
could not be discriminatory. But Falk's allegations clearly imply governmental knowl• 
edge of the other offenses, and it would be a mere technicality to insist on a more 
precisely stated claim. Compare People v. Walker, 14 N.Y.2d 901, 252 N.Y.S.2d 96, 200 
N.E.2d 779 (1964). See also Givelber, supra note 16, at 112: "The rule of pleading articu-
lated by the Court in Oyler reflects neither sensitivity to the problems presented by the 
highly selective enforcement of the law nor an objective evaluation of the needs of 
administrators and courts." 
74. At least one court allows the issue of discriminatory enforcement to be raised 
at trial as a question for the jury, see People v. Gray, 254 Cal. App. 2d 256, 63 Cal, 
Rptr. 211 (1967); other courts, however, consider that a pretrial motion to dismiss is 
the proper procedure, see, e.g., United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 175 (1978); 
People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., Inc., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1962). 
See generally, Annot., 4 AL.R.lld 404, 412-17 (1965). Falk's counsel attempted to raise 
the issue both at pretrial and at trial to ensure against possible procedural default, 
472 F.2d at 1108. 
75. 479 F.2d at 681-88. 
76. See United States v. Leahey, 484 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1970). 
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issued before the Supreme Court's decision in Gutknecht v. United 
States,71 which banned the issuance of accelerated induction orders as 
a punishment for violations of Selective Service regulations. The 
majority recognized that it was "possible" that the government had 
changed its policy of nonprosecution in the light of Gutknecht but 
felt that it was "incumbent upon the government to come forward 
with evidence that it had in fact changed its policy .... "78 However, 
the 1969 statement seems slim evidence, indeed, of the government's 
post-Gutknecht policy. & Judge Cummings commented in his dis-
sent: "The majority finds it suspicious that the Government, instead 
of blinking at criminal conduct, should enforce the law by prosecu-
tion when the administrative means of enforcement . • . was fore-
closed. Respectfully, it appears any suspicion is a product of predis-
position."711 It is doubtful that the majority's finding that a prima 
facie case of discrimination had been made can be supported by the 
evidence of deliberate suppression of Falk's draft counseling activ-
ities.80 The justification for shifting the burden should have been 
derived from evidence of some other prosecutorial policy. 
A second possible policy is that Falk was indicted because his 
case would present a "striking example."81 Although Falk was not a 
prominent public figure, he was a draft counselor, and his prosecu-
tion could be expected to have a relatively high deterrent effect on 
potential offenders. The dissenters, quoting the panel decision, ap-
parently felt that such a prosecutorial policy would be permissible: 
" '[S]elect enforcement of a law against someone in a position to 
influence others is unquestionably a legitimate prosecutorial 
scheme. . . .' "82 They described this policy as a "sensible enforce-
ment scheme of securing general compliance through prosecution of 
those who defiantly violate the law in the public eye."83 This latter 
statement contemplates selective enforcement against those whose 
offenses are committed openly, rather than against those offenders 
who are prominent because of their modes of expression or legiti-
mate conduct. But the panel's reference to "someone in a position 
to influence others" suggests a policy aimed at highly visible of-
77. 396 U.S. 295 (1970), 
78. 479 F.2d at 621. 
79. 479 F.2d at 633. 
80. Possibly, the majority believed that the draft board was guilty of deliberate 
discrimination in refusing to grant conscientious objector status to Falk. This would 
be analogous to the actions of the licensing board in Yick Wo and would be a solid 
basis for a finding of discriminatory prosecution. But the opinion makes no mention of 
willful misconduct by the draft board. 
81. Cf. text accompanying note 69 supra. 
82, 479 F.2d at 634 (Cummings, J., dissenting), quoting from the earlier panel deci-
sion 472 F.2d at 1108. No authority is cited for this proposition. 
83. 479 F.2d at 634 (Cummings, J., dissenting). 
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fenders, rather than offenses. The distinction is important. The gov-
ernmental interest in a selection policy aimed at highly visible of-
fenses could be very substantial-even "compelling." Selective pros-
ecution of highly visible offenses may be justified by the need to 
avoid the destructive example that such offenses would set if un-
punished. This rationale should not be accepted when the govern-
ment, simply to get widespread publicity, selectively prosecutes 
offenders who happen to be prominent, especially where their prom-
inence is due to the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. 
There is, however, no evidence or claim that Falk's offense was 
highly visible. True, he mailed his draft cards to the U.S. Attorney 
General, a federal district judge, and his draft board.8st But these 
actions are not highly visible in themselves and apparently were not 
publicized. Moreover, his indictment was not brought until more 
than a year after the last such offense, long after any publicity 
attendant to the act would have faded. Hence, if high visibility is at 
all involved in this case, it is the high visibility of Falk personally, 
rather than of his offense; the minority's comment simply does not 
apply here. 
A third possible selection standard was evidenced by another por-
tion of the aforementioned Selective Service policy statement: " '[l]t 
would seem that when a registrant is willing to be inducted, he should 
not be prosecuted for minor ofjenses committed during his process-
ing.' " 85 This policy would have been unaffected by the Gutknecht 
decision and, therefore, was presumably still in force. The govern-
ment had apparently decided not to prosecute draft card offenses 
until an induction order had been issued and disobeyed, in order to 
give the offender a chance to join the Army. This policy would 
explain the delay in bringing the card-carrying charges against Falk 
until the charge for refusing induction was brought. 86 The majority 
states: "The conclusion would seem to be compelling that, in the 
admitted policy of the Selective Service officials and apart from 
whether Falk's draft counseling activities were involved in the 
decision to prosecute, he was indicted and prosecuted for violation 
of the card possession requirements only because he exercised his 
First Amendment privilege to claim a statutory right as a consci-
entious objector."87 
The Selective Service statement seems to provide an adequate 
84. 4'72 F.2d at 1103. 
85. 4'79 F.2d at 622, quoting L. HERSHEY, LEGAL AsPEcrs OF SELEcnVE SERVICE 46-47 
(1969) (emphasis added by court). 
86. But Judge Cummings points out that this delay is more probably due to the 
effect of the pre-Gutknecht procedure of utilizing punitive induction orders rather 
than prosecuting for card offenses. 479 F.2d at 635 n.15. Thus, the delay in bringing 
charges provides little indication as to which policy the government was pursuing. 
87. 479 F.2d at 623. 
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prima facie showing that the government's policy was to enforce the 
card-carrying law (a "minor offense") against registrants who refused 
to obey induction orders-legally or illegally-but not against those 
who submitted to induction. The seemingly benign policy of enforc-
ing the draft card law only against those who resist an induction 
order allows any offender of that law to escape prosecution simply by 
submitting to induction when called. This is a realistic option for 
almost all offenders except conscientious objectors.88 The result of 
this policy, then, is to grant a benefit to all those who do not have 
religious scruples against war. 
The majority held that this policy was unconstitutional because 
it chilled a conscientious objector's right to resist an invalid induc-
tion order.89 The dissent responded, "[Falk's] First Amendment 
rights were freely exercised when he claimed CO status. No First 
Amendment rights were implicated in anything that transpired there-
after .''90 The majority's opinion was a departure from previous case 
law in one fundamental respect. There is absolutely no indication 
that this chilling of first amendment rights was an intended effect of 
the policy expressed in the memorandum. No malice, bad faith, or 
purposeful discrimination could be established. Under the language 
of Oyler and Snowden, therefore, selective prosecution based on this 
policy would have been permissible.91 But the majority apparently 
held otherwise. 
At this point, Judge Sprecher's majority opinion understandably 
becomes a bit hazy. Lacking clear precedent for the proposition that 
an unintentional chilling effect is enough to support a claim of dis-
criminatory enforcement, he relies on Cox v. Louisiana92 and 
88, Those offenders entitled to deferments because of the need for immediate medi-
cal care, who are nevertheless issued induction orders, are also faced with a 
dilemma. Although the right to medical treatment is not explicitly guaranteed in the 
Constitution, as is the right to free exercise of religion, a strong case could be made 
that the challenged policy denies equal protection to those entitled to such medical 
deferments. Cf. Sawyer v. Sigler, 320 F. Supp. 690 (D. Neb. 1970). 
Of course, any offender who is issued an invalid induction order-even through 
sheer clerical error-would be aggrieved by the fact that he may be prosecuted for 
card-carrying offenses if he refuses to obey the invalid order. But such an offender 
could not complain about unequal treatment any more than if the prosecutorial policy 
were to select offenders by lot. 
89. A conscientious objector's right to resist an induction order is essential to the 
first amendment's free exercise of religion clause. In contrast, the selection policies 
previously discussed allegedly chilled rights guaranteed by the first amendment's free-
dom of speech clause. 
Note that the only reason for the remand is to allow the government to show that 
the policy of enforcing the draft card law only against those who resist an induction 
order was not the reason for Falk's prosecution. See note 104 infra. 
90. 479 F. 2d at 636. 
91. See text accompanying notes 21, 31-32 supra. 
92. 479 F.2cl at 623, citing 379 U.S. 536, 557-58 (1965). 
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Crowthers.93 In Cox, the leader of a civil rights demonstration was 
convicted of obstructing public ways. The Court reversed, appar-
ently94 holding the statute at issue unconstitutional as applied be-
cause of the broad discretion vested in local officials to grant or 
refuse permits to hold public demonstrations. The decision was based 
on due process, rather than equal protection. Moreover, the potential 
for intentional racial discrimination was an important aspect of the 
case. The selection standard held unconstitutional in Crowthers was 
deliberately aimed at chilling the exercise of first amendment rights; 
therefore, that case is also inapposite.95 
However, the majority's holding is consistent with equal protec-
tion principles regularly employed by courts in reviewing the con-
stitutionality of statutory classifications. At a minimum, the classifica-
tion created must bear a rational relationship to some legitimate 
governmental purpose. 96 The Selective Service statement explains the 
purpose of the policy under consideration: " ..• reducing the number 
of cases that reach the courts and also giving the registrant, before 
being prosecuted, an opportunity to report for service in the armed 
forces."97 This implies that there were two rationales for the policy: 
administrative efficiency in enforcement, and encouraging compli-
ance with orders to report for induction. The question becomes 
whether or not these interests are furthered by the classification in-
herent in the policy. 
With regard to administrative efficiency, it could be argued that 
postponing indictments for draft card law offenses not only gives the 
offender a chance to join the Anny but also spares the government 
the expense of trying these cases. Further, it is arguably more eco-
nomical to enforce the card-carrying offenses against offenders who 
are at the same time charged with refusing induction. But, assuming 
that deterrence is the major goal of enforcing the draft card law, the 
93. 479 F.2d at 623, citing 456 F.2d at 1080. 
94. See Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup, 
Cr. REv.1. 
95. The majority also cites, 479 F.2d at 623, Chief Judge Bazelon's opinion in Dixon 
v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1968). In that case, Dixon had com• 
plained about the conduct of two police officers who had stopped him for alleged traffic 
offenses. The prosecutor apparently agreed not to prosecute the traffic charge if Dixon 
would make no further complaint. Several weeks later Dixon filed a complaint with 
the D.C. Council on Human Relations. In retaliation, the traffic charges were filed 
against him. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled that the prosecution 
was proper. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ordered 
the charges dismissed, not on constitutional grounds, but on the need to prevent agree• 
ments that attempt to protect the police from misconduct complaints. In the instant 
case no similar government misconduct is involved. Falk had not threatened to file 
complaints against the draft board or anyone else, so the rationale of Dixon is in-
applicable. 
96. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); F.S. 
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). 
97. 479 F,2d at 622, quoting L. HERSHEY, supra note 85, at 46-47. 
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efficiency of any policy must be judged by the deterrent effect that 
results from a fixed output of prosecutorial resources. This particular 
governmental policy, if generally publicized (and it was shown to be 
a matter of public record), would have no deterrent effect at all on 
the vast majority of potential offenders of the draft card law, who are 
not conscientious objectors and who know that they will not resist 
induction if called. It is therefore highly probable that enforcing the 
law randomly against all known offenders-keeping administrative 
costs at the same level as before-would have a greater over-all 
deterrent effect even though fewer charges could be brought (since 
it is more expensive to prosecute a draft card offense independently 
of other offenses). Thus, the relationship between the government's 
policy and the purpose of efficiently enforcing the draft card law may 
fail even the minimum rationality test. Certainly, it could survive no 
stricter scrutiny. 
With regard to encouraging compliance with induction orders, 
the policy may be viewed as creating a benefited class-all those who 
obey induction orders and thereby escape prosecution for draft card 
offenses-and a burdened class-all those who disobey induction 
orders and thereby suffer prosecution for card offenses. These classes 
are ideally suited to the purpose of encouraging compliance with 
induction orders. But encouraging compliance 1vith invalid induc-
tion orders cannot be a legitimate governmental objective. The pur-
pose must be redefined as encouraging compliance with valid orders 
to report. With respect to this purpose, however, the burdened class 
is overinclusive, as it includes those, like Falk, who have not dis-
obeyed valid orders. 
Overinclusive classes may well be regarded as more objectionable 
than underinclusive classes.98 However, the traditional minimum 
rationality test does not require perfect congruence between purpose 
and classification. 99 If the adverse effects of this overinclusive quality 
fell randomly on all violators of the draft card law, the policy might 
well be valid under the equal protection clause.100 But the effects are 
not random; among those that violate the draft card law, consci-
98. Cf., e.g., United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Muny, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); 
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 95 (1965); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 
supra note 22, at 1086-87. 
99. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot 
Commrs., 330 U.S. 552 (1947). 
100. But, aside from equal protection, there are strong objections to such a policy. 
By requiring those who seek judicial review of an invalid induction order to submit 
to selective prosecution for card offenses, the policy chills the right of access to the 
courts guaranteed by the fifth amendment's due process clause. Cf. Boddie v. Connecti-
cut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). Moreover, the policy makes punishment for card offenses merely 
an additional penalty for refusing induction. Such a broad sentencing decision should 
more properly be made by the legislature. Cf. People v. Golson, 32 m. 2d 398, 207 
N,E.2d 68, cert. denied, !184 U.S.1023 (1965). 
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entious objectors are subject to a greater burden in two distinct ways, 
First, due to the complexity and procedural difficulty of establish-
ing a conscientious objection claim, it seems clear that a dispropor-
tionate number of invalid induction orders will be issued to regis-
trants who .are entitled to C.O. status. Moreover, induction orders 
that are invalid for some other reason are more likely to be corrected 
quickly and easily within the Selective Service System's own admin-
istrative appeal procedure-without the necessity of disobeying the 
order. Thus, the number of conscientious objectors prosecuted for 
card offenses under this policy will be far greater than if the same 
number of prosecutions were brought randomly against all offenders. 
Second, even were there no such numerically discriminatory 
effect, the policy of enforcing the draft card law only against those 
registrants who refuse induction has a harsher impact on a conscien-
tious objector than on an ordinary registrant. The legitimate con-
scientious objector will hesitate to protest an invalid induction 
order if doing so will lead to a lengthy jail sentence for violation of 
the draft card law.101 Falk's three-year prison sentence demonstrates 
that this is not a trivial concern. But a conscientious objector in this 
situation has a difficult choice; to adhere to his religious scruples 
he is forced to resist the order and suffer conviction on the ancillary 
card-carrying charge. The ordinary registrant faced with an invalid 
induction order can simply submit to induction. Most registrants 
would view this as preferable to a lengthy jail sentence for the draft 
card offense, particularly if the invalidity of the induction order is 
due to a temporary condition, such as administrative error or short-
term physical disability, and a valid order is likely to be issued in 
the near future. 
Since the free exercise of religion is a fundamental interest pro-
tected by the first amendment,102 the discriminatory impact on con-
scientious objectors should trigger the use of an equal protection test 
more rigorous than traditional minimum rationality. Under a two-
:tiered analysis, this would lead to the imposition of the compelling 
101. To protest a classification by the draft board, a registrant who believes he is 
entitled to I-0 (conscientious objector) status may pursue an administrative remedy 
through the state and presidential appeal boards without being charged with viola-
tions of the draft card law. Moreover, his induction order will be stayed until he has 
exhausted these administrative appeals. But if all administrative procedures affirm the 
denial of I-0 status, he can obtain judicial review only by the hazardous route of 
refusing to obey an induction order and defending the criminal charge on the ground 
.of improper classification. 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. I 1972), amending 50 
U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (1970). But compare Oesterreich v. Selective Serv. Sys., 893 U.S. 
233 (1968) with Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256 (1968). The governmental policy appar-
ently followed in Falk makes this procedure still more dangerous by subjecting the 
conscientious objector to prosecution for card-carrying offenses even though he is held 
. innocent of the induction-refusal charge. 
102. See note 62 supra. 
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governmental interest test. In a recent, similar case, the Supreme 
Court formulated this test in a less rigid but still strict manner: 
" ... the crucial question is whether there is an appropriate govern-
mental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment."103 
Under either formulation, or under any form of scrutin,y stricter 
than minimum rationality, it seems clear that the governmental in-
terest in encouraging compliance with valid induction orders can-
not justify the burden placed on the free exercise of religion by the 
selective prosecution of the draft card law only against those who 
refuse induction. 
The policy of selectively prosecuting the draft card law against 
those who disobey induction orders cannot be justified in light of the 
discriminatory impact on conscientious objectors. Since the Selective 
Service statement presented at trial constituted prima facie evidence 
that this policy led to the decision to indict Falk on the card-carrying 
counts, the majority's remand of the case for a hearing at which the 
burden of showing that this policy was not responsible for that indict-
ment seems correct.104 
United States v. Falk is an important case for several reasons. It 
continues the salutary trend (started by Crowthers and Steele) of 
shifting the burden of production to the government after the 
defendant's establishment of a prima facie case of discriminatory 
prosecution. Second, Falk is the most important, and perhaps the 
only, case105 that allows the defense of discriminatory prosecution 
despite the total absence of any malice or bad faith. Falk's more 
obvious claim-the first policy discussed above-did involve deliber-
ate prosecutorial discrimination. But the majority's holding that a 
prima fade case was established should only refer to the policy set 
forth in the Selective Service statement-a policy to which no invidi-
ous purpose was or could be attributed. This development properly 
ignores the restrictive language of Oyler v. Boles and Snowden v. 
103. Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). The Court cited Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), a case that involved state residency requirements for voters; 
yet, voting was the first interest to be declared fundamental, Harper v. Virginia Bd. 
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
104. Judge Cummings' dissent states that the only purpose of the remand is to 
determine the motivation of the prosecutors. 479 F.2d at 627. This is in line with bis 
general preoccupation with refuting the charge of deliberate discrimination against 
Falk's freedom of speech. But it seems more accurate to say that the purpose of -the 
remand is to allow the government to prove that it was not following a policy of 
prosecuting the draft card law only against those who refuse induction-a policy now 
held to be violative of equal protection because of its effect on Falk's free exercise of 
religion. 
105. Cf. United States v. Robinson, 311 F. Supp. 1063 (W.D. Mo. 1969). Whether 
Robinson involved prosecutorial "bad faith" is largely a matter of semantics. One com-
mentator concluded that "[i]mplicit in the Robinson decision is the belief that pres-
ence of an invidious motive for prosecution is not required for a finding of discrim-
inatory enforcement." Comment, 55 MINN. L. REv. 1234, supra note 12, at 1242. 
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Hughes, and goes a long way toward fulfilling the promise of Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, that the concept of equal protection applies to laws
that are discriminatorily administered no less than to laws that are
inherently discriminatory. Unfortunately, most courts are loathe to
give the equal protection clause full rein in this area.100 The confu-
sion between the selection policies discussed in Falk weakens its
precedential value and allows courts that are so inclined to explain
the result as merely a simple application of Crowthers in a case of
deliberate discrimination.
Moreover, Falk is certainly an atypical discriminatory prosecution
case. It is rare, indeed, that the prosecutorial selection policy is set out
in print by the government. But, to the extent that courts, admini-
strators, and prosecutors heed Professor Davis' advice, such instances
will become more common. Falk demonstrates that the formulation
and publication of the rules that structure executive discretion can
ensure against unwarranted interference with constitutional rights.
106. E.g., United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973); Rhinehart v. Rhay,
440 F.2d 718,727 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 825 (1971).
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